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LEGAL MALPRACTICE-IS THE DISCOVERY
RULE THE FINAL SOLUTION?
California finally has joined a minority of state and federal ju-
risdictions1 in instituting a much needed reform in the area of legal mal-
practice. The supreme court in the cases of Neel v. Magana, Olney,
Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand2 and Nixen v. Budd' abandoned the majority
rule which provides that the negligent act is the time at which a cause
of action for legal malpractice accrues for statute of limitations pur-
poses. Under the newly adopted rule, the cause of action accrues at
the time the client discovers or should have discovered the attorney's
negligence and is damaged thereby. When these decisions are taken
together, they constitute an attempt to balance the conflict between the
policy considerations on which the statute of limitations is based and
the purposes behind an action for legal malpractice. Nevertheless, the
result, although more equitable for the client, does not achieve the de-
sired balance. This fact was recognized by the court, which invited a
legislative solution4 since no further judicial action is possible.
The decisions in the two cases are related in that they both turn
on when the cause of action accrues, but they have different results due
to their facts. In Neel, the court had to decide "whether the client's
claim should be outlawed before he knew of it or should have known of
it"' or, in other words, "whether members of the legal profession should
enjoy a preference as to the date when they may succcessfully bar ad-
verse claims under the statute of limitations."7 The court concluded that
1. Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir
1967); Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So.2d 372 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Mumford v. Staton,
Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969); Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d
477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968). These cases abandoned the negligent act or omis-
sion as the time the statute of limitations starts to run in legal malpractice cases.
2. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
3. 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
4. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 192-93, 491
P.2d 421, 431-32, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 847-48 (1971).
5. Id. at 183, 491 P.2d at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (1971).
6. In earlier legal malpractice cases, the courts held the action accrued on the
date of the attorney's negligence or omission. E.g., Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal. App.
2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963). For other professions the courts had set the date of
accrual at the time of the client's or patient's discovery of the professional's negli-
gence or omission. E.g., Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). See
text accompanying notes 117-123 infra.
7. 6 Cal. 3d at 182-83, 491 P.2d at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (1971).
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legal malpractice actions are similar to all other malpractice actions
and accrue for statute of limitations purposes only when the client dis-
covers or should have discovered his cause of action.8 On the other
hand, the issue in Budd was whether "the client, who knows or should
have known of the attorney's negligence, must be damaged before the
statutory limitations period starts to run."9 In resolving this issue the
court held that in legal malpractice the cause of action does not accrue
until the client suffers damage and that the determination of when he
was damaged is an issue of fact. 10
This note will discuss both the historical and policy reasons for the
court's decisions and will focus briefly on the basis of its authority to
make such a change." The apparent dilemma created by the conflict
of policy considerations of the statute of limitations with the purposes
of a legal malpractice action will be more fully and analytically dis-
cussed.'2  Finally, a statutory solution for this dilemma will be pro-
posed."
The Neel Case
Neel arose out of a wrongful death action brought by the Neels
against San Bernadino County. The defendants, a partnership practic-
ing under the name of Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, prop-
erly filed the action for wrongful death on behalf of the Neels on May
25, 1962. Nonetheless, the action was dismissed on December 10, 1965
for the attorneys' failure to serve summons within three years of filing
the complaint.' 4 Plaintiffs, however, did not know of this dismissal
until they consulted independent counsel on December 21, 1967.15
They commenced the malpractice action on August 13, 1968.16 The de-
fendant partnership asserted that the plaintiffs' cause of action had
accrued on May 25, 1965, the last day for service of the summons in
the wrongful death action.' 7  The trial court accepted this assertion
and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations ap-
plicable to legal malpractice.
8. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
9. Id. at 183, 491 P.2d at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
10. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 198, 491 P.2d 433, 434, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 850
(1971).
11. See text accompanying notes 24-86 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 104-15 infra.
13. See text accompanyinig notes 141-42 infra.
14. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 581a (West Supp. 1972).
15. Brief for Appellants at 5.
16. 6 Cal. 3d at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
17. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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The court of appeal reversed,1 8 noting the inequity of applying the
negligent act rule to plaintiffs who did not discover their cause of ac-
tion until after it was barred by the statute of limitations.' 9 In doing
so, the appellate court cited the California Supreme Court's dictum in
Heyer v. Flaig2 ° as an inviation to adopt the discovery rule in deter-
mining when a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues.2s Judge
Kaus, writing the unanimous opinion of the court, found it inconsis-
tent to hold that an attorney is a fiduciary with a duty of full disclosure
and then to reward his silence by permitting the statute of limitations
to run from the time of the negligent act.22 Thus the majority rule
effectively allowed an attorney to avoid liability for professional mal-
practice by breaching his fiduciary duty of prompt and complete dis-
closure. On appeal, the supreme court also rejected the defendants' con-
tention that the proper statutory construction of Code of Civil Procedure
section 339 had been settled by eighty years of precedent and that the
two year statute of limitations commences to run from the date of the
negligent act of the attorney and not from the date of the discovery by
the client.23
Historical Support For The Discovery Rule
The generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that a
cause of action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limita-
tions commences to run at the time of the negligent act of the attor-
ney.24  The United States Supreme Court established the basis for this
rule in an early decision by holding that, "[w]hen the attorney was
chargeable with negligence or unskillfulness, his contract was violated,
and the action might have been sustained immediately. '25  Thus the
negligent act rule has a deep seated history in United States jurisdictions.
Nonetheless, in Neel the California Supreme Court pointed out that
a close scrutiny of the cases involved in the development of the negli-
gent act rule reveals that the court never really adopted the rule in
attorney malpractice cases. 26  Rather, California's "adoption" of the
negligent act rule was due to an "unwarranted headnote" in the offi-
18. 14 Cal. App. 3d 813, 92 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1971).
19. Id. at 827, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
20. In Heyer the court stated as follows: "We note that the very theories
which led to the rule in medical malpractice cases that the statute runs only from the
date of discovery of the negligence could be applied to the instant situation . ..."
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 233 n.7, 449 P.2d 161, 168 n.7, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 n.7
(1969).
21. 14 Cal. App. 3d 813, 815-16, 92 Cal. Rptr. 814, 815 (1971).
22. Id. at 827, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
23. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 183-87, 491 P.2d 421, 424-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840-44 (1971).
24. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978, 986 (1968).
25. Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 182 (1830).
26. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 183-87, 491 P.2d 421, 424-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840-44 (1971).
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cial reporter accompanying the 1886 case of Hays v. Ewing.27  In that
case, the defendant attorney had been retained to institute proceedings
for the collection of a debt. Due to his negligent failure to plead a de-
fense to the statute of limitations, the proceedings were dismissed. The
plaintiff, although aware of the dismissal, 2s did not bring a malprac-
tice action against the defendant until two and one-half years had
passed. According to the headnote accompanying the case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had felt constrained to hold that the plaintiff was
barred from basing his action on the defendant attorney's neglect prior
to the dismissal of the collection suit, since under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 339 the statutory time had run. 9 Yet, in Neel the
court searched "in vain within the body of the opinion or within the
facts of the case for any justification for this publisher's note."3
Although the Neel court was thus able to reject the Hays case, prior
California decisions did not reflect such a careful examination. For
example, soon after Hays, the district court of appeal in Lattin v. Gillette
considered and directly rejected the contention that the accrual of a
cause of action for professional malpractice could be delayed thus
tolling the statute of limitations under section 339 of the Code of Civil
Procedure." The court applied the negligent act rule. 2  Neverthe-
less, the Neel court found that Lattin was not authoritative because it
had been effectively overruled by legislative amendment to Code of
Civil Procedure section 339 in 1913. 33  The negligent act rule as de-
27. 70 Cal. 127 (headnote) (1886).
28. Hays knew of the dismissal of the earlier action because "within one year af-
ter the judgment . . . [Hays] demanded of the defendant [Ewing] . . . that he [Ewing]
should take an appeal ...... Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 128, 11 P. 602 (1886).
29. Id.
30. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 183, 491 P.2d 421, 425, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1971). The
headnote in question states that "[U~nder section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
a cause of action against an attorney for neglect of duty in the management of an ac-
tion is barred at the expiration of two years after the neglect occurred." Hays v.
Ewing, 70 Cal. 127 (1886).
31. 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892).
32. Id. at 320, 30 P. at 546.
33. 6 Cal. 3d at 184. The amendment statute provided in part that "an action
founded upon a contract, obligation or liability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract
or guarantee of title of real property, or by a policy of title insurance; provided, that
the cause of action upon a contract, obligation or liability evidenced by a certificate,
or abstract or guarantee of title of real property, or policy of title insurance shall not
be deemed to have accrued until discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the ag-
grieved party thereunder." Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 187, § 1, at 332. By this amendment,
subdivision 1 was extended to cover an action founded upon a contract, obligation
or liability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or guarantee of title of real property,
or by a policy of title insurance, and a proviso was added specifying when such a
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued. The current law reads in pertinent
part; "[Aln action founded upon contract, obligation or liability, evidenced by a certifi-
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lineated in the "ubiquitous headnote" of Hays was not directly fol-
lowed again by the courts until DeGarmo v. Luther T. Maya, Inc.,34
some forty-nine years later. The court of appeal in that case quoted the
erroneous headnote of Hays as authority for the proposition that a cause
of action in legal malpractice accrued at the time of the negligent act
and that any action must be brought within two years thereafter.3 5
This application of Hays was followed by another lengthy period 36 dur-
ing which no appellate cases concerning the acrrual of a cause of action
in legal malpractice were reported. The silence, however, was broken
by the court of appeal in Griffith v. Zavlaris,37 a 1963 case. In that
case, the court clearly expressed its ambivalence toward the "time hon-
ored" negligent act rule38 but felt compelled to wait for a legislative
change in the rule.39
In its review of the cases developing the negligent act rule,40 the
Neel court stated that prior to Griffith "no case had rejected by decision
or express dictum a date of discovery rule for attorney's malpractice
. . ,"41 The court also found that in two court of appeal cases it
had been "assumed that justifiable nondiscovery would extend the pe-
riod of limitation. ' 42  In one case the court had ignored Hays en-
tirely,43 and in the other it had fashioned a possible exception to the
harsh result of the negligent act rule. 4 In addition to these court of
ficate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real property, or by a policy of title insurance
...shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or damage suf-
fered by the aggrieved party thereunder." CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 339(1) (West Supp.
1972).
34. 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366 (1935).
35. The court in DeGarmo v. Luther T. Mayo, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 606
(1935), quoted verbatim from the headnote in Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127 (1886).
36. Twenty-nine years. - 6 Cal. 3d 176, 185, 491 P.2d 421, 426, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
842 (1971).
37. 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963).
38. "Although the application of the rules of legal malpractice actions may seem
harsh, nevertheless it would appear that if the time-honored rules as to the commence-
ment of the limitation provided in section 339, subdivision 1, is to be changed, it should
be changed by the Legislature with appropriate conditions, so that the liability of an
attorney would not exist indefinitely." Id. at 830-31, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
39 Id.
40. Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892); Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127,
11 P. 602 (1886); Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517
(1963); DeGarmo v. Luther T. Mayo, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366 (1935).
41. 6 Cal. 3d at 185, 491 P.2d at 426, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
42. Id.
43. Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934).
44. In Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 P. 683 (1927), the court of appeal
clearly stated in dictum that justifiable nondiscovery could extend the limitations period.
"Unquestionably where confidential relationship, such as the relationship between at-
torney and client, exists, failure to discover the facts constituting fraud or misrepre-
sentation may be excused. . . ." Id. at 526, 258 P. at 686.
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appeal decisions, the supreme court found further authority for its de-
parture from Hays in its own decision of Lally v. Kuster.45 In that case,
the court apparently disregarded the Hays decision by delaying the ac-
crual of a cause of action for legal malpractice until injury resulted
from the negligence.16  The attorney's negligence was his failure to
follow the client's instructions and proceed immediately with the action.
The result was a dismissal for failure to prosecute diligently. 47 Be-
cause no earlier holding specifically rejected delaying the accrual of a
cause of action until the client's discovery, this case was crucial to the
Neel court. In Lally the court delayed accrual until the dismissal of
the action. This was sufficient to place the action within the limita-
tions period.48
The Policy Reasons Favoring the Discovery Rule
Thus finding no historical basis for applying the negligent act
rule to legal malpractice actions, the Neel court turned its attention to
the policy considerations relevant to determining the proper time for ac-
crual of the cause of action. Weighed with the policy factors was the
fact that the legal profession was the sole profession to which the dis-
covery rule did not apply and that the fiduciary nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship seemed to call for its application. For many
years, the California courts have applied the discovery rule in the area of
medical malpractice4" where the physician-patient relationship is sim-
ilar to that of attorney and client.50 In fact, the negligent act rule
was abandoned in 1936, when the supreme court concluded that a phy-
sician's negligence continued until the time he attempted to correct it.
This attempt coincided with the time of the patient's discovery.5" Fur-
thermore, the discovery rule has been applied to other professions, 2
and in each case leading to its application the courts rejected the con-
tention that the rule of legal malpractice should be applied to bar the
action.53 They reasoned that where a fiduciary obligation was involved,
45. 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. "Ylet where the disobedience complained of consists in delay only, the cause
of action cannot be said to arise until such delay has resulted in some injury, as it
did when the court dismissed the case because of the delay." Id. at 791, 171 P. at
964.
49. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
50. Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice In California: A Shaky Citadel, 10
SANTA CLARA LAw. 257, 259 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wallach & Kelly]. See text
accompanying note 138 infra.
51. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 310, 57 P.2d 908, 912 (1936).
52. See text accompanying notes 117-23 infra.
53. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 186-87, 491 P.2d 421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (1971).
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postponement of the cause of action was necessary until the bene-
ficiary knew or should have known of the breach of fidelity.54  The
courts also noted that the negligent act rule had been applied solely to
legal malpractice situations. 55
Thus the legal profession was the lone exception to the "general
rule that in actions for professional or fiduciary malpractice, the cause
of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or should dis-
cover the negligence . *."..56 It has been argued that there are
sound social policies favoring this status. The arguments include the
unusual vulnerability of attorneys to malpractice actions and the
thwarting of innovation and progress in the profession.57  Other pro-
fessions, especially medicine, suffer under these same disabilities with
little apparent effect. Such reasons seem even more inadequate when
compared with the potential hardships resulting from the application
of the negligent act rule faced by the client-plaintiff.
The second policy consideration supporting the discovery rule in
professional malpractice cases is the special relationship between pro-
fessional and client. The Neel court felt that this relationship justi-
fied a departure from the ordinary rule in tort and contract actions.5 8
The court gave three reasons for the existence of this special relation-
ship. The first is the duty of skill and care commonly exercised by
members of a profession and which an attorney or any other profes-
sional owes the client or patient.59 Included in this reason is the lay-
man's inability to detect a misapplication of professional principles or
theories even though the professional makes no attempt to hide his
efforts. Hand in hand with this is the ability of the professional to
hide his negligence from the client's view.60 Attorneys can be particu-
larly skillful in this endeavor through the use of bewildering terminol-
ogy. Finally, a fiduciary relationship exists between attorney and cli-
ent.0 1 Such a relationship requires that the attorney fairly and accu-
rately disclose all facts to the client. Failure to do so is a breach of this
54. E.g., United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 597,
463 P.2d 770, 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1970).
55. Id. at 596, 463 P.2d at 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
56. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 491
P.2d 421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (1971).
57. Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice
Actions-The Need for Re-Evaluation: Eckert v. Schaal, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 230
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitations].
58. "In ordinary tort and contract actions, the statute of limitations . . . begins
to run upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action." 6
Cal. 3d at 187, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (1971).
59. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
March 1973] LEGAL MALPRACTCE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
duty. The court held that the discovery rule "prevents the fiduciary
from obtaining immunity for an initial breach of duty by a subsequent
breach of the obligation of disclosure."6 2
The Court's Authority To Establish The Rule
Despite these policy reasons for adopting the discovery rule, the
court had to justify its power to do so. This was necessitated by several
challenges presented by the defendants. Each challenge was fully dis-
cussed by the court as to its validity and then rejected as to the Neel
case in particular.63
The defendants initially contended that, even though a change in
the existing rule may be desirable, such a change should come from the
legislature.64 Conceding that no statute specified when a cause of ac-
tion accrues in legal malpractice and that the negligent act rule was
court made, the defendants argued that the judicial rule was never
changed by the legislature which therefore accepted and adopted it.65
In making this contention, the defendants erroneously relied on Alter
v. Michael6 in which the trial court granted a motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the affirmative defense that the one year statute of
limitations67 applied to legal as well as medical malpractice. The su-
preme court reversed, 68 holding that different statutes of limitation al-
ways had been applied to legal and medical malpractice by the courts.
Furthermore, the legislature had amended the statute of limitations
that applies to each profession without changing the severability of
application of each statutory period.69  The Alter court reasoned
that the legislative intent must have been to leave the judicial treat-
ment unchanged.7 0  Therefore the Alter case "involved the construc-
tion of a statute, a matter on which the legislative intent is of major
importance .... ,71 The difference between Alter and Neel was that
in Alter the trial court followed legislative intent in prescribing the
length of the statutory period; in Neel, the court merely decided when
that period commenced. The rule regarding the commencement of the
62. Id. at 189, 491 P.2d at 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
63. Id. at 190-93, 491 P.2d 430-32, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 846-48.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966).
67. Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 258, § 2, at 232, as amended, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
340.5 (West Supp. 1972).
68. Alter v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966).
69. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 339(1) (West Supp. 1972), formerly Cal. Stat. 1913,
ch. 187, § 1, at 332.
70. 64 Cal. 2d at 483, 413 P.2d at 155, 50 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1966).
71. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Catheart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 191, 491
P.2d 421, 430, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 (1971).
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statutory period was judicially created and one upon which the legisla-
ture never had expressed its intent.
In the alternative, the defendants argued that legislative inaction
could be construed as passive approval.7" The Neel court, however,
was of the opinion that mere legislative silence was not sufficient to
bar the court from re-examining its own premises.73 The passive ap-
proval argument could not stand since the rule in question dated only
from Griffith v. Zavlaris,74 a 1963 case, and never had been the sub-
ject of an express holding by the supreme court. The court interpreted
the legislature's silence as possible deference to court action in this area
due to the superior experience and expertise of the judiciary.75
The defendants' second contention was phrased by the court as a
syllogism: "[I]f a date of discovery rule should be accompanied by an
absolute limitation, but courts cannot enact such limitation, then the
courts should not adopt the discovery rule. ' 76  The defendants ob-
jected to the undue burden placed on the legal profession by changing
the rule to discovery by the client, thus exposing the attorney to lia-
bility indefinitely. The court, aware of the need for an outside limita-
tion, invited the legislature to take appropriate action.77  Nonethe-
less, it found that the potential burden placed on the legal profession
was outweighed by the injustice done to the client and the impugning of
the integrity of the entire profession when the negligent act rule was used
to bar a client's suit before he could have discovered it.78  Despite its
awareness of the need for an outside limitation, the court rejected this
second contention as not applicable to the Neels since they brought
their action within three years and two months of the negligent act
which is well within the medical malpractice statute of limitations79 and
within "any reasonable limitation period likely to be enacted."8 0'
The defendants' last contention was that the discovery rule should
be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.81  The court
stated that the general rule was for full retroactivity where the court of
72. Id. at 191, 491 P.2d at 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
73. Id.
74. 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963).
75. 6 Cal. 3d at 192, 491 P.2d at 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 192-93, 491 P.2d at 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
78. Id. at 192, 491 P.2d at 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
79. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 340.5 (West Supp. 1972), which reads in pertinent
part: "In an action for injury or death against a physician [or other medically related
person] . . .based upon such person's alleged professional negligence . . . four years
after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs."
80. 6 Cal. 3d at 193, 491 P.2d at 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 848 (1971).
81. Id.
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supreme jurisdiction overruled a former decision.8 2  Exceptions have
been made in circumstances where "fairness and public policy preclude
full retroactivity."8 3a Resolution of the issue turned on reliance on the
old rule and the ability of the litigants to foresee the coming change in
the rule.84  Neither factor worked in favor of the defendants because
few attorneys commit malpractice in reliance on the statute of limita-
ions and the change in the law was foreseeable due to the continuous
criticism heaped on the prior rule by both the courts" and commenta-
tors.86 Thus the discovery rule was held to apply retroactively.
The Budd Case
An important supplement to the Neel rule was established in Budd
v. Nixen.s7 That case involved Budd, the president and a stockholder
of Hawarden Hills, Incorporated, his attorney Nixen, and a real es-
tate broker named Milburn. Hawarden, through Budd, entered into a
written agreement with Milburn on November 8, 1962. A disagree-
ment ensued, and Milburn filed an action on February 5, 1963 for breach
of contract against Hawarden, Budd, and the other corporate officers.
Hawarden retained Nixen, who filed an answer on behalf of the cor-
poration only, admitting the contract, but denying any breach or lia-
bility. Nixen was retained by Budd on July 31, 1963 and subsequently
filed an answer to Milburn's complaint on behalf of Budd in his indi-
vidual capacity. The answer filed by Nixen lacked the affirmative de-
fense that Budd had signed the contract with Milburn only in his capac-
ity as president of Hawarden and therefore bore no personal responsi-
bility for its breach. 8 The case proceeded to trial on September 15,
1964, and while it was under submission, Budd dismissed Nixen and
retained another attorney, whereupon he discovered Nixen's negli-
gence. On November 4, 1965, judgment was entered against both
the corporation and Budd in the sum of $75,000. After remittitur8 9
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Alter v. Micahel, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966);
Yandell v. Baker, 258 Cal. App. 2d 308, 65 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1968); Griffith v. Zavlaris,
215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Sacks, Statutes of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16
CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1967); Baxter, Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice, 18
CLEvE. ST. L. REv. 82 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Baxter]; Wallach & Kelly, supra
note 50, at 257; Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1963); Note,
Commencement of Statute of Limitations, supra note 57.
87. 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
88. Id. at 198, 491 P.2d at 434-35, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
89. "Remittitur" is the power of a trial court to grant a motion for a new trial,
in cases of excessive verdicts, conditioned upon the refusal of the plaintiff to accept a
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issued Budd was compelled to pay Milburn $38,450.6190
On September 11, 1967 Budd filed the malpractice action against
Nixen to recover damages which resulted from the adverse judgment.
The trial court granted Nixen's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the statute of limitations barred Budd's cause of action,
because the two year period governing legal malpractice actions runs
from the time of the negligent act. The decision of the trial court was
affirmed on appeal,91 and Budd appealed to the supreme court alleg-
ing that a "cause of action for attorney malpractice is a tort and does
not accrue unless and until it causes actual damage."92  Budd further
contended that the court should grant this petition due to the conflicting
decision by the court of appeal in the Neel case,93 "in order to secure
uniformity of decision and settle this most important question of law."94
The Neel decision95 called for a review of the trial court's deci-
sion in Budd. The California Supreme Court seized the opportunity
presented by Budd to clarify the application of the new discovery rule
to tort actions for legal malpractice. The facts in Budd presented the
rare situation in which the client discovered his attorney's negligence
prior to suffering any consequential damage. Unfortunately little guid-
ance from the legislature was found to resolve the issue thus pre-
sented.9" In its determination of when the cause of action accrued,
the Budd court examined elements of a cause of action in tort for
professional negligence.9 7 It concluded that an attorney's negligent con-
duct which does not cause damage or merely causes nominal dam-
age, speculative harm or the threat of future harm creates no cause of
action in tort.98 A cause of action is not generated "until the client suf-
fers appreciable harm as a consequence of his attorney's negligence
lesser amount. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 1068 (5th
ed. 1971).
90. 6 Cal. 3d at 199, 491 P.2d at 435, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
91. Budd v. Nixen, 92 Cal. Rptr. 899, rev'd, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971).
92. Appellant's Brief for Hearing in Supreme Court at 3.
93. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
94. Appellants Brief for Hearing in Supreme Court at 3.
95. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
96. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 312 (West 1954) reads in pertinent part: "Civil ac-
tions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this
title, after the cause of action shall have accrued. .. ."
97. "(1) [IThe duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence
as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of
that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negli-
gence." 6 Cal. 3d at 200, 491 P.2d at 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
98. Id.
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... ,99 The court in Budd did not specify what constituted "appre-
ciable harm," except to state that a client's cause of action could arise
prior to his sustaining all or even the majority of the damage proxi-
mately caused by his attorney's negligence. 100 Once the client discovers
his attorney's negligence and has suffered some damage, the statutory
period commences and he must institute his action within the pre-
scribed period.'0 1
Even though the court established this rule, it did not make a fi-
nal determination. Budd may have suffered damage when he was
forced to pay attorney's fees and legal costs to Nixen, in which case, if
these fees were paid more than two years' 012 prior to the filing of the
malpractice action, it is barred by the statute of limitations. If, as
Budd contends, sufficient damage was not incurred until the judgment
was entered against him in the action brought by Milburn, then Budd's
action against Nixen may have been filed within the statutory period.
The question of when Budd actually sustained damage was not an-
swered in the Budd decision. In reversing the trial court, the supreme
court noted that the proper answer to the factual issue would have to
await "either a trial of the cause or a motion for summary judgment with
declarations and points and authorities directed to that issue." '13
The Discovery Rule Does Not Provide the Final Solution
The policy considerations or justifications for the statute of limita-
tions are not per se in conflict with the purposes behind a cause of ac-
tion for legal malpractice. The main impetus of the statute of limita-
tions, as applied to legal malpractice, is to protect the attorney from
unfair client action. The cause of action for legal malpractice is de-
signed to protect the client and the legal profession from substandard
performance by attorneys.10 4 The problem is finding a date for the time
of accrual of a cause of action which balances the policy considerations
of the statute of limitations and the purposes behind an action for legal
malpractice without favoring attorneys at the expense of their clients or
vice versa. The California Supreme Court in Neel, while adopting the
discovery rule, recognized that it alone would not provide such a proper
balance. -
Using the negligent act of the attorney as the time for commence-
ment of the statute of limitations may appear to have harsh effects in
99. Id.
100. Id. at 201, 491 P.2d at 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
101. Id. at 201, 491 P.2d at 437, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
102. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 339(1) (West Supp. 1972).
103. 6 Cal. 3d at 203-04, 491 P.2d at 438, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (1971).
104. Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitations, supra note 57, at 235.
105. 6 Cal. 3d at 192, 491 P.2d at 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
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some circumstances, but there are several policy considerations militat-
ing in its favor. The overriding consideration behind the statute of
limitations is putting to rest stale claims which clients had intentionally
or inadvertently failed to prosecute, thus allowing an attorney to pur-
sue his career without fear of surprise attack later.10 6 Having a statu-
tory period encourages diligence on the part of a client in prosecuting an
action under the assumption that a valid claim would not be neg-
lected. 10 7 Additionally it acts as a safeguard against the thwarting of
innovation and progress within the legal profession by limiting the po-
tential liability of the attorney.'
On the other hand, legal malpractice actions help to maintain the
competence and dignity peculiarly necessary to a profession which is
intimately involved in shaping the standards to which our society is
held. Such actions present deterrents to substandard professional con-
duct which are in addition to those provided by various state legis-
latures'0 9 and bar associations." 0  An action for legal malpractice
also provides the client with an opportunity to be compensated for his
injuries.
The time at which a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues
necessitates the balancing of the interests sought to be protected by
the statute of limitations and by an action for legal malpractice. Setting
the accrual time at the negligent act or omission of the attorney estab-
lishes a definite outside limit in which an action must be brought,
but such a limit raises many problems of its own. The most serious
of these problems is the preclusion of the effectuation of the purposes
behind an action for malpractice."' The Neel case is an example of
one fact situation which could arise as a result of this problem. Com-
mencing the prescribed period at the time of the attorney's negligent
act allowed the period to run before the client was even aware of the
negligence. Another problem is the subordination of the client's
rights to the actions of a third party." 2  Such a situation occurs when
the client is made aware of the negligence only after an action is
brought against him by a third party. If the third party does not file the
action against the client during the statutory period within which the
client must bring his action against the attorney, the client may be barred
from any redress. Under the negligent act rule, a client must immedi--
ately bring an action, assuming he becomes aware of its existence, even
106. Baxter, supra note 86.
107. Id.
108. Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitiations, supra note 57, at 236-37.
109. See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 823, 831 (1964).
110. Id. at 829.
111. Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitations, supra note 57, at 235.
112. Id. at 233-34.
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though resultant future injury is only a possibility. Thus the negligent
act rule may stimulate speculative litigation.'13 Finally, the circumspect
client, aware of the negligent act rule, would be forced to hire a second
attorney to check on the first during the statutory period, discour-
aging a close, continuous attorney-client relationship." 4
The California Supreme Court in Neel and Budd changed the time
of accrual of a cause of action from the occurrence of the negligent act
to the discovery thereof in the hope of alleviating some of these problems.
The court found it necessary in today's complex and interdependent so-
ciety to broaden and deepen the responsibility of the legal profession to
its clients." 5 The discovery rule more accurately effectuates the pur-
poses behind an action for legal malpractice, but at the same time it dras-
tically reduces the protection provided the legal profession by the stat-
ute of limitations. No outside time limit is established by this new
rule that would bar a stale claim freshly discovered.
A Statutory Amendment Would Resolve This Problem
The supreme court in Neel took note of the fact that a solution to
the problem created by the discovery rule must come from the legisla-
ture." In determining a viable legislative solution, it is helpful to look
at the other California professions to which the discovery rule is applied
and at other jurisdictions which apply that rule to the legal profession.
The rule of the Neel case has previously been applied to a trust-
ee," 7 an insurance agent,"' and an escrow agent," 9 an accountant, 21
a strockbroker,' 2 and a title company122 by case law. The discovery
rule has also been statutorily applied to contract obligations involving
real property title guaranties or title insurance policies.' 23 In the early
113. Id.
114. Id. at 235.
115. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Catheart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491
P.2d 421, 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848-49 (1971).
116. Id. at 192-93, 491 P.2d at 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
117. Cortelyou v. Imperial Land Co., 166 Cal. 14, 20, 134 P. 981, 983 (1913).
118. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 594-95,
463 P.2d 770, 777, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (1970).
119. Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 534, 375 P.2d 33, 36,
25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1962).
120. Moonie v. Lyrnch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 365-66, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (1967).
121. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 726, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 246 (1968).
122. Cook v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1969).
123. "[A]n action founded upon a contract, obligation or liability, evidenced by a
certificate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real property, or by a policy of title insur-
ance . . . shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or dam-
age suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder." CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 339(1)
(West Supp. 1972).
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cases involving medical malpractice, the California courts uniformly
held that the original injury was the sole cause of action and subse-
quent complications or lack of discovery by the patient did not toll the
statute of limitations. 12 4 The California Supreme Court re-evaluated its
position on this issue in Huysman v. Kirsch.12 5 There the defendant,
a physician and surgeon, had been hired by the plaintiffs to remove the
cancerous uterus of the plaintiff-wife. The defendant negligently left
a rubber tube in her abdomen. This tube was not removed until
nearly two years later. The court established a new rule which delayed
the time of accrual from the negligent act of the physician until the pa-
tient discovered or with reasonable diligence could have discovered
the physician's negligence.12 6 The Huysman decision placed the med-
ical profession in approximately the same position in which Neel and
Budd now place the legal profession.
The legislature has only acted to set an outside time limit after
which no action can be brought for professional malpractice in the area
of medical malpractice.127  The legislative solution regarding the med-
ical profession was not adopted until 1970, some thirty-four years
after Huysman. While the legislation maintained the rule of the
Huysman decision that a cause of action is barred one year after the
discovery of the negligence,128 it limited the time in which the client
could discover to four years. 12 9 Such limitation on the discovery rule
seems reasonable and may afford the proper balance between the
policy considerations of the statute of limitations and the purposes be-
hind an action for legal malpractice.
In a majority of American jurisdictions, the statute of limitations
commences to run only after the right to prosecute such a cause of ac-
tion has accrued. 3 0  California is in agreement with this rule.' The
time at which a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues is a matter
normally left to court construction by most jurisdictions. 32  While
courts of most states continue to recognize the negligent act or omis-
sion of the attorney as the time of accrual, 3 3 the trend in the recent
decisions dealing with this issue appears to be in accord with Neel
and Budd in a movement away from the negligent act rule and toward
124. Gum v. Allen, 119 Cal. App. 293, 6 P.2d 311 (1931).
125. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
126. Id. at 312, 57 P.2d at 913.
127. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 340.5 (West Supp. 1972).
128. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 310-11, 57 P.2d 908, 912 (1936).
129. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 340.5 (West Supp. 1972).
130. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978, 986 (1968).
131. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 312 (West 1954).
132. Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLum. L. REV. 1292, 1308 (1963).
133. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978, 986 (1968).
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the discovery rule.' 4  For example, a recent New York decision '13 5
has moved that jurisdiction in the direction of adopting the discovery
rule for legal malpractice. There the court held that the "continuous
treatment" rule'1 6 followed in medical malpractice cases should be fol-
lowed in legal malpractice. 137  Such a rule would toll the statute of
limitations until the attorney-client relationship was terminated. That
court was of the opinion that:
In both instances [medicine and law] the relationship between the
parties is marked by trust and confidence; in both there is presented
an aspect of the relationship not sporadic but developing; and in
both the recipient of the service is necessarily at a disadvantage to
question the reason for the tactics employed or the manner in which
the tactics are executed. 138
Both Maryland' 39 and the District of Columbia 0 have recently held that
in an action for breach of duty in performing services or for negligence
the time of accrual is the date of discovery by the client or the date
the damage occurs following discovery.
This trend toward the acceptance of the discovery rule has not
been followed by legislative limitations on the time in which a client
can discover his attorney's negligent act or omission and still success-
fully bring an action. The California legislature could resolve the con-
flict between the policy considerations of the statute of limitations and
the purposes behind an action for malpractice by amending section 339
of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows:
4. An action against an attorney, accountant, escrow agent, in-
surance agent or company, trustee, stockbroker, . . based
upon such person's alleged professional negligence, or for
rendering professional service without consent, or for error or
omission in such person's practice, must be commenced:
(a) within six years 14 1 after the malpractice occurs or two
134. Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So. 2d 372 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Mumford v.
Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969); Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App.
Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
135. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
136. Under the "continuous treatment" doctrine the statute of limitations does
not commence to run until the physician-patient or attorney-client relationship is termi-
nated as to the matter in question. Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitations,
supra note 57 at 240; accord, Note Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292,
1308 (1963). See also Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York
& Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 345 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Lillichi.
137. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-35 (1968).
138. Id.
139. Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1968).
140. Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
141. In a medical malpractice situation the injury is physical and therefore should
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years after the plaintiff discovers, or through use of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered the negligence or
misconduct, whichever first occurs; or
(b) if the relationship continues for more than four years,
then within two years after the termination of such rela-
tionship; provided, however, that the transaction from
which the cause of action arises must be the subject of
the continuing relationship or a part thereof.
(c) This time limitation should be tolled for any period
during which such person has failed to disclose any act,
error or omission upon which such action is based and
which is known or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence should have been known to him. 4'
In addition to establishing an outside limit on a professional's liability,
this proposed statute defines professional malpractice and sets the date
of accrual of a cause of action at the date of discovery. Section (c)
of the proposed statute would indefinitely extend the discovery pe-
riod in those cases where the attorney can be charged with failing to dis-
close his negligence. Nevertheless, this certainly is justifiable because
active concealment is a clear breach of the professional's fiduciary duty.
Conclusion
The Neel and Budd decisions place California in the forefront of
the states which have adopted the date of discovery as the time of ac-
crual for a cause of action for legal malpractice. Thus, the legal profes-
sion now is subject to the same standards that have been imposed on
other professions.143 To balance the considerations of the statute of
limitations with the purposes behind an action for legal malpractice
more is needed. The judiciary has gone as far as it can with the Neel
and Budd decisions. The entire area of professional malpractice is in
need of definition and clarification. It remains for the legislature to
forge the courtmade rules into a clear, concise statute applicable to pro-
fessional malpractice.
Steven H. Felderstein*
become apparent to the plaintiff-patient within the prescribed four year period. Mal-
practice by a professional described in the proposed statute is of an esoteric nature
and therefore more difficult to ascertain. Thus a professional should be subject to a
longer period of liability.
142. Note, Commencement of Statute of Limitations, supra note 57, at 243. See
also Note, 45 ORE. L. RaV. 73, 80 (1965) both of which have proposed statutes. See
Lillich, supra note 136, for a collection of malpractice statutes from other jurisdictions.
143. See text accompanying notes 117-23 supra.
* Member, Third Year Class
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